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At-issueness in direct quotation: the case of Mayan quotatives*
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Brown University
Abstract In addition to lexical verbs of saying, many languages have more gram-
maticized means for reporting the speech of others. This paper presents the first
detailed formal account of one such device: quotative morphemes in Mayan lan-
guages, with a focus on Yucatec Maya ki(j). When mentioned in previous literature,
quotatives have either been regarded as a special kind of verb of saying or reportative
evidential. I argue that quotatives have important differences (and some similarities)
with both verbs of saying and reportatives. To capture these properties, I propose a
‘scoreboard’ account where quotative ki(j) signals that the co-occurring quotative
material demonstrates a move in an in-narrative scoreboard.
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1 Introduction
All languages presumably have lexical verbs of saying (henceforth SAY) roughly
analogous to English say, ask, and tell that can used to report the speech of others,
usually in combination with linguistic material that characterizes in some way the
form and/or content of what was said/asked/told. Alongside these lexical means
of reporting speech, many languages also have reportative evidentials – functional
morphemes such as Yucatec Maya (YM) bin REP in (1).1
* First and foremost, my heartfelt thanks to the native speaker language consultants who shared
their language with me and whose hard work and careful thinking helped produce many important
insights: Rosa Isela Canche Cen, Margarita Hau Hau, Norma Patricia Kuyoc Kuyoc, and Luis Petul.
Thanks also to Pranav Anand, Diti Bhadra, Miguel Oscar Chan Dzul, Masha Esipova, Donka Farkas,
Polly Jacobson, José Alfredo López Jiménez, Irma Yolanda Pomol Cahum, Wilson Silva, and the
audiences/reviewers at FAMLI 5, UConn, McGill, Topics at the Semantics-Pragmatics Interface at
UC Santa Cruz, and SALT 29 for helpful comments and ideas about this material.
1 The following abbreviations are used for glosses: CTQ: contrastive topic question, DAT: dative, DEF:
definite article, DIST: distal, IMPER: imperative, IPFV: imperfective aspect, INTERR: interrogative,
MIR: mirative, NEG: negation, NEG.CL: negative/extrafocal clitic, PFV: perfective aspect, PL:
plural, PREP: preposition, PROG: progressive aspect, PROX: proximal deixis, REL: relational
noun suffix, SUBJ: subjunctive mood, TOP: topic marker, For agreement morphology, I follow the
terminological tradition among Mayanists, referring to Set A (≈ Ergative/Nominative) and Set B (≈
Absolutive/Accusative) markers, e.g. A3 = 3rd person Ergative/Nominative.
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(1) Context: I am talking with you when my friend Alfredo calls on the phone.
I tell you after the call:
Le
DEF
péek’=o’
dog=DIST
t-u
PFV-A3
jant-aj
eat-SS
bin
REP
paastel
cake
‘The dog ate birthday cake, I heard (from Alfredo telling me)’
In this paper, we present the first detailed formal analysis of a third type of
reported speech device: quotatives like Yucatec Maya ki(j) QUOT, in (2).2
(2) Le
DEF
péek’=o’
dog=DIST
t-u
PFV-A3
jant-aj
eat-SS
paastel
cake
—kij
QUOT.B3
‘ “The dog ate birthday cake” —he says.’
While there is ample variation within both reportatives and verbs of saying, there
are also some more or less consistent properties distinguishing the two. We return
to examine these properties in more detail below, but summarizing briefly based on
recent literature on reportatives (e.g., Faller 2002, Matthewson, Davis & Rullmann
2007, Murray 2010, 2014, 2017, AnderBois 2014, 2017), we can draw the following
conclusions:
(3) Properties of Reportatives and Verbs of Saying:
REP Verbs of Saying
Indirect speech use? Yes Yes
Direct speech use? No Yes
Original speech event not at-issue Often conventional Pragmatic
Interaction with sentence type Variable, complex Narrow scope
Details of original speech event Implicit Explicit
On the infrequent occasions where they have been discussed, QUOT have gener-
ally been considered a special case of SAY (e.g. Bary & Maier 2018) or REP (e.g.
Krawczyk 2012, Blain & Déchaine 2007). In contrast, we argue here that Mayan
QUOT differ substantially from both REP and SAY in the properties in (3) and there-
fore ought to be considered a distinct phenomenon from both. Mayan QUOT always
involve direct speech reports, unlike REP, but have conventional not-at-issueness,
unlike SAY. In contrast with both REP and SAY, they always take wide scope relative
2 The name ‘quotative’ has been used in previous literature to several distinct phenonema. First, the
term has sometimes been used, especially in older literature, to refer to what we are calling here
reportative evidentials. Second, the term has been applied to complementizers which introduce direct
quotation or some kind and/or complements which blur the line between direct and indirect speech in
some way, such as Japanese -to/-tte (e.g. Maier 2009), A’ingae khen, Kannada anta (Jayaseelan &
Amritavalli 2017). Some of these complementizers may also exhibit standalone ‘insubordination’-like
uses where they occur in the absence of a lexical SAY. We set aside this sort of quotative here as it is
a fundamentally different phenomenon.
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to illocutionary mood, and allow for a conventional encoding of certain aspects of
the original speech event, but not others. To capture these properties, we develop a
formal analysis within a scoreboard model of discourse following AnderBois 2014,
2017, Farkas & Bruce 2010.
§2 summarizes the major formal properties of QUOT and REP in Mayan lan-
guages; §3 argues that QUOT involve direct quotation with all indexicals shifting,
whereas REP do not; §4 argues that despite involving direct quotation, QUOT con-
ventionally mark facts about the original speech event as not-at-issue content; §5
contrasts the illocutionary effects of REP and QUOT in non-declarative sentences; §6
develops a formal analysis of QUOT building on AnderBois (2014, 2017)’s score-
board analysis of REP; and §7 concludes.
2 Formal properties of Mayan quotatives and reportatives
In this section, we briefly review the formal properties of QUOT, focusing on Yucatec
Maya ki(j), and comparing it with bin REP. We refer the reader to AnderBois 2019
for more extensive description (see also Lucy (1993), Hull (2003), López Jiménez
(2010), Curiel (2016) for description of individual languagues). Outside of the
Eastern subfamily (where the empirical situation is somewhat murkier), most Mayan
languages have QUOT and REP:
(4) Tentative list of REP and QUOT in (non-Eastern) Mayan Languages
Language/Branch REPORTATIVE QUOTATIVE
Wastek kwa’ ??
Yucatecan bin ki(j)
Yokot’an a’i’ ??
Ch’ol bi che’
Ch’orti’ ayi che
Tseltalan la xi
Tojolab’al b’i chi’
Chuj ab’ chi
Q’anjob’al (h)ab’ xi
Akatek ab’ xhi
Popti’ ab’/ob’ xi
Mocho’ ab’/abi’/bi’ ki
Despite the substantial differences we will show below, the line between them in
previous literature has has often been quite blurry. One reason for this is that many
authors have focused on perlocutionary effects shared by the two forms (e.g. ‘speaker
distancing’) but in contrast to sentences with no reported speech elements. Second,
REP and QUOT can frequently co-occur not only with one another but also with
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SAY. As illustrated in (5), such sentences typically receive a ‘reportative concord’
interpretation, i.e. they are compatible with scenarios with only a single original
speech event rather than requiring a sequence of such events.
(5) Teen=e’
1SG=TOP
chéen
only
t-in
PROG-A1
máan
pass
—ki
QUOT
bin—
REP
kux
CTQ
túun
then
teech?
2SG
‘I’m just passing by —he said— and you?’ (Can Canul & Gutiérrez-Bravo 2016:
p.22)
In terms of their distributional properties, the position of both REP and QUOT
is prosodically determined. REP in Mayan languages are prosodically integrated
and are typically second position clitics (e.g. Curiel 2016 for Tojolab’al =b’i). Our
main focus here, YM bin, is most typically second position, but exhibits quite a bit
more flexibility, being possible at any prosodic word boundary.3 In contrast, QUOT
are prosodically unintegrated, constituting – along with their arguments – their own
parenthetical intonational phrase either medially, (7), or more commonly, finally, (8).
(6) [T-u
PFV-A3
jantaj
eat
bin
REP
paanucho
panucho
le
DEF
máak=o’]IntP
person=DIST
‘That guy ate panuchos, I heard.’
(7) [T-u
PFV-A3
jantaj
eat
paanucho
panucho
le
DEF
máak=o’]IntP
person=DIST
[kij
QUOT
teen
DAT.1SG
Margarita]IntP
Margarita
‘ “That guy ate panuchos” – Margarita told me.’
(8) [T-u
PFV-A3
jantaj]IntP
eat
[kij
QUOT
teen
DAT.1SG
Margarita]IntP
Margarita
[paanucho
panucho
le
DEF
máak=o’]IntP
person=DIST
‘ “That guy” – Margarita told me – “ate panuchos”. ’
Although REP are often described as markers of hearsay, REP are equally felici-
tous in situations where the original speaker’s identity is clear in context, often to the
point of being essentially anaphoric, (9). Despite this, REP do not license any overt
expression of the original speaker (see AnderBois 2017 for YM bin), nor of other
aspects of the original speech event such as the addressee, spatiotemporal properties,
manner, etc.
(9) Context: I am talking with you when my friend Alfredo calls on the phone.
I tell you after the call:
Le
DEF
péek’=o’
dog=DIST
t-u
PFV-A3
jantaj
eat
bin
REP
paastel
cake
‘The dog ate birthday cake, he (Alfredo says)’
3 For example, in (6), bin could also be realized following paanucho or máak (but preceding the clausal
clitic =o’ DIST).
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In contrast, ki(j) QUOT inflects to encode the original speaker being quoted via
set B/Absolutive agreement, as seen in the paradigm in (10), and allows for an overt
nominal expression as well (e.g. Margarita in (7)). Additionally, the addressee
can be overtly expressed as a dative argument (e.g. teen DAT.1SG in (7)). While
this differs plainly from REP, it also differs in several ways from SAY. First, the
agreement pattern with QUOT is unlike that of SAY. Second, whereas finite verbs in
YM ordinarily require aspect/modal marking, QUOT do not allow for this possibility.
Finally, negation and other sorts of adverbial modifiers found with SAY are not
possible with QUOT. In sum, QUOT differ from both REP and SAY in allowing for
limited aspects original speech event to be encoded.
(10) Yucatec Maya Quotative Paradigm:
k-en k-ech ki(j)4 k-o’on k-e’ex ki(j)-o’ob
QUOT-B1SG QUOT-B2SG QUOT.B3SG QUOT-B1PL QUOT-B2PL QUOT-B3PL
‘I said’ ‘you said’ ‘s/he said’ ‘we said’ ‘you all said’ ‘they said’
3 Quotatives involve direct quotation
The most fundamental – and arguably definitional – property of QUOT is that they
involve a canonical direct speech report, whereas REP pattern with indirect speech.
To see this, consider the original speech event in (11). Having been the addressee of
(11), I could then subsequently report this original speech event using either REP
or QUOT, as in (12). If I choose to do so with QUOT, as in (12a), it is the original
speaker’s words which I must use, with indexical expressions interpreted relative to
the original speaker, María. In (12a), these are the first person agreement marker in
A1SG, as well as the mirative particle bakáan MIR, which AnderBois (2018) shows
to be uniformly speaker-oriented. Conversely, with REP in (12b), it is the meaning of
the original speaker that must be maintained, but indexical expressions like pronouns
and particles are interpreted relative to the speaker of (12b) rather than María. We
see the same pattern for all other deictic expressions including vocatives (e.g. (25a)),
second and third person pronouns, spatial and temporal5 indexicals, etc.
(11) Context: María is studying and sees storm clouds on the horizon and realizes
she needs to stop studying in order to get home before the rains come. She
4 Given its absence in 1st and 2nd person forms, the i(j) in the 3rd person singular form at first blush
appears to be the perfective/subjunctive status suffix -ij. While a likely diachronic source for it, two
facts argue against this synchronically. First, the 3rd person plural form is kijo’ob, whereas the status
suffix -ij is blocked by the presence of -o’ob B3SG in all other uses. Second, the 3rd person singular
quotative is ki(j) rather than k even when an overt subject DP or dative addressee DP occurs, as in
(7-8), whereas the status suffix -ij only surfaces in intonational phrase final position.
5 YM is a tenseless language, Bohnemeyer (2002), so we cannot look at tense itself.
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says:
K’abéet
NECES
bakáan
MIR
in
A1
ts’o’oksik
finish
in
A1
xook
study
‘Oh, I need to finish studying.’
(12) Context: María said (11) to me and I tell you later:
a. K’abéet
NECES
bakáan
MIR
in
A1
ts’o’oksik
finish
in
A1
xook
study
–kij
QUOT
teen
DAT.1SG
‘ “I need to finish studying” – she told me.’
b. K’abéet
NECES
bin
REP
(#bakáan)
MIR
u
A3
ts’o’oksik
finish
u
A3
xook.
study
‘She needs to finish her studies, she says.’
Beyond this, we see that substitution of coreferring expressions is possible
with REP, (14b), but not with QUOT, (14a). That is to say, QUOT involve verbatim
quotation, while REP do not. As discussed by Maier (t.a.) for mixed quotation, the
relevant notion of “verbatim” is itself vague, with the degree of precision required to
be considered verbatim being context-dependent.
(13) Context: A mother tells you that her son is afraid of being bit by a dog:
In
A1
iijo=e’
son=TOP
sajak
afraid
káa
for
chi’ibik
bite.PASS.SUBJ
tumeen
by
le
DEF
péek’=o’
dog=DIST
‘My son is afraid that the dog will bite him.’
(14) Context: After talking to the mother, you tell your friend about the original
speech event in (13):
a. # Le
DEF
champaal=o’
boy=DIST
sajak
afraid
káa
for
chi’ibik
bite.PASS.SUBJ
tumeen
by
le
DEF
péek’=o’
dog=DIST
–kij
QUOT
Intended: ‘The boy is afraid that the dog will bite him (she says).’
b. Le
DEF
champaal=o’
boy=DIST
sajak
afraid
bin
REP
káa
for
chi’ibik
bite.PASS.SUBJ
tumeen
by
le
DEF
péek’=o’
dog=DIST
‘The boy is afraid that the dog will bite him (she says).’
In sum, the material which co-occurs with QUOT shows all6 of the signs of
direct quotation, being subject to a verbatim requirement, including all indexical
6 N.B. some of the additional tests used in recent literature to distinguish direct quotation from other
forms of indexical shift such as NPI-licensing and wh-extraction cannot be applied to QUOT since
QUOT themselves cannot be negated, questioned, etc. The impossibility of wh-extraction and NPI
licensing across QUOT therefore does not tell us anything further in this case.
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expressions. REP, on the other hand, show no signs of this, with indexical expressions
of all sorts interpreted relative to the current speaker rather than the speaker of the
original speech event.
4 Reported speech event conventionally not at-issue in quotatives
Thus far, we have seen that YM ki(j) QUOT involve verbatim direct quotation, in
stark contrast to REP, which involve indirect speech only. While this already differs
from SAY in that the QUOT only occur with direct speech reports, it nonetheless is
similar to one use of SAY. In this section, we show that QUOT are distinct from SAY
– and like REP – in another respect: they conventionally encode the not-at-issue
status of the original speech event itself. Coupled with their unique prosodic and
formal properties laid out in §2, we conclude that QUOT differ in substantial ways
from both SAY and REP.
Simple past uses of SAY and REP both entail the existence of an original speech
event, i.e. the prior speech event the speaker reports on using the utterance containing
the SAY or REP. Although both entail the existence of such an event, this content
typically has a different status in the two cases. For REP in many7 languages, the
existence of the original speech event with particular properties cannot be the main
point according to various properties, i.e. is what has come to be called “not-at-
issue” content. In contrast, SAY at least have the potential for the original speech
event to serve as at-issue content, although a suitable context can render this content
not-at-issue, as has been discussed by various recent works (e.g. Simons 2007,
Hunter 2016, AnderBois 2016).
Recent literature on reportatives and evidentials generally (e.g. Faller 2002, 2006,
Matthewson et al. 2007, Murray 2010, 2014, 2017) presents several diagnostics for
the not-at-issue status. Applying these to YM, we show that bin REP and ki(j)
QUOT both have the existence of the original speech event along with details of it as
not-at-issue content.
The first diagnostic for at-issueness concerns QUD-sensitivity: is a given sen-
tence which entails the existence of a prior speech event felicitous as a response to
QUDs8 about who said what to whom? If a sentence is felicitous in such a context,
7 There are a few cases of REP which – while presumably being used primarily in this way – have been
argued to not conventionally encode that the fact of the original speech event is not-at-issue content:
Faller 2006 for German sollen, Matthewson et al. 2007 for St’átimcets ku7, Korta & Zubeldia 2014 for
Basque omen, Kierstead (2015) for Tagalog daw. Regardless, the cross-linguistic overall nonetheless
presents a clear contrast with verbs of saying, which, to my knowledge, never conventionalize
at-issueness in this way.
8 N.B. this is hard to test with simple Question-Answer pairs since even matrix sentences with no
reported speech element of any kind are often felicitous in response to relevant QUDs. For example,
the following English dialogue is felicitous:
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then the claims about the original speech event are at-issue content (though as noted
above, the same form could be used in a ‘pragmatically parenthetical’ way in a
different context). If infelicitous, then the claims about the original speech event are
not-at-issue.
As we see in (15), the original speech event with YM bin REP is not-at-issue
content according to this diagnostic:
(15) José
José
bin
REP
óokolt
steal.AGENTFOCUS
le
DEF
wakax=o’.
cow=DIST
‘José stole the cow they say.’
a.XScope-at-issue QUD: You are a detective trying to figure out who stole
the cow.
b. 7 Report-at-issue QUD: You already know who stole what animals, but
are trying to figure out which crimes the speaker has heard about to study
how gossip spreads.
Turning to QUOT, we find the same pattern. Although the sentence in (16) entails
the existence of a prior speech event with the words Yaan wáay tu kajil espita,
the sentence is infelicitous as a response to QUDs about who said what, including
more specific QUDs such as ‘What did Luis say?’. We return below to examine the
contexts in which such a sentence is felicitous, but note that they are ones where the
quoted words themselves are appropriate in some salient context.
(16) Yaan
EXIST
wáay
ghost
t-u
PREP-A3
kaj-il
town-REL
espita
espita
–ki
–QUOT.B3SG
teen
DAT.1SG
‘ “There’s ghosts in Espita” –he tells me.’
a.XScope-at-issue QUD: A character in a narrative is trying to find out if
there are ghosts in Espita.
b. 7 Report-at-issue QUD: You want to know what Luis said about ghosts
is his town.
A second diagnostic used in recent literature on evidentials concerns whether or
not unmarked responses analogous to English ‘yes’ and ‘no’ can be used to respond
(i) Q: “What did you hear?”
(ii) A: “(That) John is in jail.”
We assume that the A response in such a case is a fragment answer, felicitous not due to A’s
response addressing the QUD, but rather because A’s response receives an elliptical interpretation ‘I
heard that John is in jail’. Additionally, in many such cases, the SAY in the question itself may be
interpreted as pragmatically parenthetical such that the QUD in the discourse does not concern who
said what.
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to the existence/properties of the original speech event. In §5, we consider sentence
types other than declaratives, which in some sense can be thought of as generalizing
this diagnostic insofar as interrogatives and imperatives license/require different
sorts of responses. For reportative bin in YM, such responses can felicitiously used
only to target the content being reported, but not the facts of the original speech act
itself:
(17) Context: I was talking with my friend Juan on the phone and am talking to
another friend now.
Jach
very
k’asa’an
bad
bin
REP
Oscar
Oscar
‘Oscar is very bad (Juan says).’
a. XMa’
NEG
jaaj=i’
true=NEG.CL
(leti’=e’
he=TOP
ma’
NEG
bey=o’)
like.that=DIST
‘That’s not true (he’s not like that)’
b. 7 Ma’
NEG
jaaj=i’
true=NEG.CL
(mix
no
máak
person
t-u
PFV-A3
ya’alaj
say
bey=o’)
like.that=DIST
Intended: ‘That’s not true (no one said that).’
Once again, ki(j) QUOT patterns similarly in that unmarked responses are infelic-
itous as a means of confirming or denying the existence/properties of the original
speech event. One important difference to note here is that such responses are simply
infelicitous in response to QUOT, rather than receiving a different interpretation
relating to the original speech event (indeed the actual addressee of a sentence with
QUOT generally does not give any explicit response). We expand on this difference
in more detail below. The basic intuition is that a speaker who utters a sentence like
(17) with a reportative does make an assertion of some kind using the content of the
original speech event. In contrast, a speaker using a QUOT as in (18a) performs a
quite different speech act for which these responses are inappropriate.
(18) a. Bobi’=e’
Bobby=TOP
u
A3
k’áat
want
káa
for
lúub-uk
fall-SUBJ
le
DEF
bak’=o’
meat=DIST
–ki.
–QUOT.B3SG
He goes “Bobby (a dog) wants the meat to fall”
b. # {Jaaj
true
// ma’
NEG
jaaj=i’}
true=NEG.CL
Intended: ‘Yeah.’ // ‘No.’
One further diagnostic which to my knowledge has not been discussed in previous
literature is the ability of the element to occur without any explicit, non-pronominal
realization of the original speech event’s content/form. Since SAY present the facts
of the original speech event as their at-issue content, they have uses in which the
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content/form of the original speech event is either realized pronominally (e.g. He
said that, She told me /0) or is simply not present despite being entailed to exist (e.g.
She spoke, He pontificated). Since illocutionary REP, on the other hand, encode the
not at-issue status of the original speech event, they are infelicitous in such uses9:
(19) Context: I am talking on the phone with a friend to ask about the weather
in our town so we can decide whether to bring umbrellas. You ask me if it’s
started to sprinkle yet.
*Bin.
REP
Intended: ‘He says that.’
Of course, some cases of REP may be infelicitous without their scope content for
independent morphological or prosodic reasons (e.g. a REP which is a verbal affix
could not occur without the verb). As a clitic, YM bin REP is arguably of this sort.
Turning to ki(j) QUOT, we find that it too is infelicitous as seen in (20) (and already
observed by Lucy 1993: p. 100), requiring the quoted material to be explicit. Unlike
in the case of bin REP, there is no independent reason to expect ki(j) to have such a
requirement since ki(j) is prosodically and morphologically independent.
(20) a. Jaan-en
eat-IMPER
–kij-o’ob
QUOT-B3PL
(ti’).
DAT.3SG
‘ “Eat!” they say (to him).’
b. * Kij-o’ob
QUOT-B3PL
(ti’).
DAT3SG
Intended: ‘They say it (to him).’
Summing up, we find that QUOT pattern like (illocutionary) REP in that they
conventionally mark the original speech event as not-at-issue content.
9 REP which are claimed to contribute to at-issue content in some way at least have the potential
to be felicitous in such uses. This possibility is realized for Tagalog daw, which – despite having
clearly illocutionary uses (e.g. as discussed by AnderBois (2017)) – has been argued convincingly to
contribute to at-issue content in some cases (e.g. Schwager 2010, Kierstead 2015):
(i) Da-rating
FUT-come
si
DIR
John.
John
‘John is coming.’ Schwager 2010: p. 228
(ii) Daw.
REP
‘So they say.’
380
At-issueness in direct quotation: the case of Mayan quotatives
5 Reportatives and quotatives beyond declaratives
We have just seen that QUOT are similar to REP in marking the original speech event
as not-at-issue content. However, we also saw an important difference: the material
from the original speech event with QUOT is not readily targeted by unmarked
responses. In this section, we look across different sentence types to show that while
both are possible across major sentence types, QUOT and REP have quite different
illocutionary effects.
Cross-linguistically, REP show a good deal of variability in their grammatical-
ity across sentence types and their interpretation when grammatical. In terms of
grammaticality, reportatives appear to obey the following implicational hierarchy:
(21) Reportative implicational hierarchy (tentative):
ImperativesREP > InterrogativesREP > DeclarativesREP
Within Mayan, some languages disallow reportatives outside declaratives (e.g.
Q’anjob’al), but most languages allow REP in all three major sentence types (e.g.
Haviland 2004 for Tsotsil la, Curiel 2016 for Tojolab’al =b’i). When grammatical,
interrogatives with reportatives are known to give rise to some variation across
languages, with two main readings widely attested. First, we find what has been
called the ‘Interrogative flip’ interpretation, where the reportative meaning is applied
to the expected answer of the addressee (cf. Murray 2017 and references therein).
Second, we have what has been dubbed ‘Interrogative by proxy’ uses in which the
reportative meaning is applied to the question itself, in effect passing along the
question from the original speaker (cf. Faller 2002: §6.3.2). Note that in both cases,
the resulting utterance still typically involves an actual illocutionary question, i.e. one
which the addressee is expected to answer. In some languages, both interpretations
are possible, as seen with Tagalog daw REP in (22).
(22) Sino
who
daw
REP
yung
DEM.LNK
kumanta?
singer
‘Who was the singer?’ Tagalog
a.XBy-proxy context: You went to a concert. My roommate wants to know
about the concert and asked me to ask you about it.
b.XFlip context: Your roommate went to a concert, but I know you didn’t.
I ask you about the concert with the expectation that you will respond
according to what you’ve been told by your roommate.
In contrast, YM bin – and other Mayan REP as best as can be discerned from
attested examples in prior work – only allows the by-proxy interpretation:
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(23) Uts-chaj
good-PROC
wáaj
INTERR
bin
REP
le
DEF
cha’an=o’
spectacle=DIST
‘Was the concert good?’
a.X By-proxy context: You went to a concert. My roommate wants to know
about the concert and asked me to ask you about it.
b. # Flip context: Your roommate went to a concert, but I know you didn’t.
I ask you about the concert with the expectation that you will respond
according to what you’ve been told by your roommate.
Turning to imperatives with REP, when they are grammatical, they appear from
what little is known to be cross-linguistically uniform in interpretation. Imperatives
with reportatives serve the same range of illocutionary functions as other imperatives,
as seen in (24a-24b) for YM bin (cf. AnderBois (2017) for detailed discussion and
parallel data from Tagalog daw).
(24) a. Order Scenario: Our mother has told me to make sure that my younger
sibling eats their dinner. After talking to her, I tell my sibling:
Uk’
drink.IMPER
bin
REP
a
A2
wo’och
meal
k’eyem=o’
pozole=DIST
‘Drink your pozole (she orders)!’
b. Offer Scenario: A child’s mother has told them they should offer cake to
guests. The child says to a guest:
Jaant
eat.IMPER
bin
REP
le
DEF
paastel=a’
cake=DIST
‘Eat this cake (Mom told me to offer it)!
Summarizing across the three major sentence types, YM bin REP does not alter
the basic illocutionary update associated with the sentence type. Returning to QUOT,
the situation we find is quite different. While QUOT are compatible with all three
major sentence types, the resultant utterances do not have the characteristic illocu-
tionary update otherwise associated with each sentence type. Rather, we find that
across all three major illocutionary moods, sentences with QUOT uniformly produce
a speech act of ‘dialogue narration’. While another character within the narrative
universe may respond to the characteristic illocutionary effect of the sentence (e.g.
providing an answer in the case of an interrogative), it is infelicitous for the actual
addressee to respond in these ways. We have seen this above for declaratives in (18a)
and illustrate it here for interrogatives and imperatives:
(25) Interrogative
a. -Hijo,-
son
k-en
QUOT-B1SG
ti’,
DAT.3SG
-buka’aj
how.many
le
DEF
tikin
dry
muuk
seed
a
A2
meentmaj-e’ex=o’?
do-A2PL=DIST
‘ “Son,” I said to him, “how many dry plantings did you do?” ’
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b. To’on=e’-,
we=TOP
ki,
QUOT.BS3G
-casi
almost
veinte
twenty
yaale’.
??
‘ “Us”, he said, “almost 20 units of land”. ’ Narraciones mayas, p. 275
(26) Imperative
a. Ok-en
enter-IMPER
ka
for
kan
read
le
DEF
k’aay
song
k-in
IPFV-A1
meentik=a’
make=PROX
–ki
–QUOT
bin.
REP
‘Come in to learn the song we’re making!’
b. Ka
for
jo’op’
begin
u
A3
k’aay
sing
xan.
too
‘She began to sing’ Maayáaj ts’ikbalilo’ob kaampech, p. 23
6 A scoreboard account of quotatives
We have seen above that despite introducing direct verbatim quotes, QUOT nonethe-
less share with REP that they conventionally encode the existence and properties of
the original speech event as not-at-issue content. This is a counterintuitive state of
affairs from the point of view of the literature on quotation and also the literature on
at-issueness.
For quotation, arguably the central focus of previous accounts is precisely to take
something quite unlike ordinary, at-issue propositional content – the linguistic form
being quoted – and find compositional ways to nonetheless allow it to contribute
to propositional content. That said, many of most challenging cases traditionally
considered such as mixed quotation, partial quotation, and pure quotation do not arise
for Mayan QUOT. Instead, Mayan QUOT are used almost exclusively for quoting
stretches of dialogue in narrative discourse.
For at-issueness, we typically think of not-at-issue content as contributing ‘side
notes’ to at-issue content. If the facts about the original speech event itself are
not-at-issue as we have claimed, what, then, is the at-issue content in these cases?
The linguistic material being quoted would seem to be the only candidate, and yet
it’s not clear how linguistic material could possibly be at-issue content. That said, we
can again note the unique nature of Mayan QUOT and in particular the fact that their
use is limited to narration. A speaker’s primary purpose in telling a story is plausibly
not to figure out what the actual world is like (i.e. to answer Roberts (1996)’s “Big
question”), but rather to provide a characterization of some other reality, that of the
narrative.
In this section, we briefly sketch an account of Mayan QUOT which makes use
of this intuition to capture the core facts about QUOT within a Farkas & Bruce
(2010)-style ‘scoreboard’ model of discourse. In §6.1, we review AnderBois (2014,
2017)’s scoreboard account of REP. In §6.2, we extend the account to QUOT, arguing
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that QUOT conventionally encode that the speaker is recreating or demonstrating an
update to an in-narrative scoreboard.
6.1 REP in the scoreboard
Following AnderBois (2017, 2018), we take a discourse context C to consist of
a tuple 〈I,S,Table, DCx〉. I is the set of individuals who are participants in the
discourse, for the sake of simplicity, we take I to contain only two individuals,
a and b. S is the joint action state of the discourse, consisting of information,
preferences, etc. that are shared among discourse participants and serve as the basis
for planning their joint goals and actions, both conversationally and domain goals
beyond the conversation. We take S to be comprised of three elements: the Common
Ground CG{a,b}, Questions Under Discussion QUD{a,b}, and Common Effective
Preferences CPref{a,b}. CG{a,b} and QUD{a,b} are Roberts and Stalnaker’s familiar
notions, while CPref{a,b} is the shared effective preference structure of a and b (see
Condoravdi & Lauer (2012, 2016) for the notion of effective preferences).10. The
Table represents proposals to update components of S subject to negotiation by the
discourse participants in I and governed by constitutive rules laid out in Farkas &
Bruce (2010) (as well as normative constraints regarding how such proposals relate
to S). Finally, we have for each individual x ∈ I, DCx the set of propositions p such
that x is publicly committed to believe p.
The three basic sentence types, then, place on the Table proposals to update
the various components of S: CG{a,b} for declaratives, QUD{a,b} for interrogatives,
CPref{a,b} for imperatives. One key claim of Farkas & Bruce (2010) is that the
conventional effect of declaratives includes updates to both the individual DCa and
a proposal to update CG{a,b}. While imperative and interrogative sentences might
invite inferences about the speaker’s personal goals and preferences, we follow
AnderBois (2018) in these to not be part of the conventional effect of these sentence
types, unlike in the case of declaratives.
(27) a. Context: Alfredo is talking to Beatriz
It’s raining.
b. Scoreboard update for (27a):
a C b
DCa p Table{a,b} p DCb
CG{a,b} QUD{a,b} CPref{a,b}
where p is the proposition that it is raining (at the time/location of utterance)
10 The idea that imperatives contribute proposals to update something like shared effective preferences
has developed in a variety of recent works such as Starr (2013), von Fintel & Iatridou (2017),
AnderBois (2017), AnderBois (2018), and Rudin (2018).
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One important departure from many prior scoreboard models is that we take
both CG{a,b} and DCx to be primitives, rather than being interdefinable as they
are in works such as Gunlogson (2001) and Farkas & Bruce (2010). Whereas
Stalnaker (1978) famously defines CG{a,b} as the set of propositions that a given set
of conversational participants {a,b} is publicly committed to acting as though are
true, DCx concerns public commitments to actual beliefs, with no caveat for “acting
as though”.11
AnderBois (2014, 2017) makes use of the disconnect between these two in order
to analyze REP such as YM bin REP as creating ‘asymmetric’ updates where DCa
and a’s proposal do not match in content. Specifically, REP modifies the update the
speaker makes to DCx while leaving the proposal placed on the Table unmodified,
as in (28b). For a declarative like (28a), then, the effect is one of face-saving: a tries
to steer I towards acting jointly as though p, while avoiding staking their epistemic
reputation on the truth of p through disclosing their reasons for proposing to act as
though p more explicitly.
(28) a. Scenario: I am talking on the phone with a friend to ask about the weather
in our town so we can decide whether to bring umbrellas and I tell you:
Táantik
IMM.PAST
bin
REP
u
A3
chuunul
start
u
A3
toosol
sprinkle
ja’=e’
water=TOP
‘It just started to sprinkle (he says).’
b. Scoreboard update for (28a):
a C b
DCa REP(p) Table{a,b} p DCb
CG{a,b} QUD{a,b} CPref{a,b}
where p is the proposition that it is raining (at the time/location of utterance)
There are two important aspects of the proposal to note in the current context.
First, in terms of the illocutionary update associated with the sentence, sentences
with REP place the same proposal on the Table as those with no REP. This prediction
is correct in that as we have seen above (and in more detail in the works cited),
sentences with Mayan REP can be used to perform the same range of speech acts as
corresponding sentences with no REP. Second, in terms of at-issueness, the account
captures the observation that the facts concerning original speech act are not-at-issue
content. As Farkas & Bruce (2010) highlight in their account of unmarked responses
like ‘yes’ and ‘no’, at-issueness concerns the content placed on the table. At the same
time, Farkas & Bruce (2010) formalize the Table as being a special sort of QUD,
thus allowing for an account of the connections between QUDs and at-issueness.
11 From the prose in these prior works, it is not entirely clear how different the conceptual definitions of
DCx and CG{a,b} really are. Nonetheless, we regard the decision to take CG{a,b} to be equivalent to⋂
x∈IDCx as incompatible with the view here.
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6.2 QUOT in the scoreboard
Whereas REP in Mayan languages still are used to make the same range of illocu-
tionary updates as sentences with no reported speech elements, we have argued that
QUOT uniformly are used to perform speech acts of dialogue narration, one where
facts about the original act are not at-issue. The intuition we pursue here is the scope
material with Mayan quotatives interacts with a discourse scoreboard just like any
matrix utterance would, it just does so within the universe of the narrative. That is to
say, what we need in order to capture Mayan quotatives are ‘ad-hoc’ scoreboards
inside of narrative universes which quotative utterances update. Narration, whether
of fiction or of non-fiction, is akin to building a separate conversational reality, and
narrating dialogue is a special case of this. The original speech material with QUOT
should therefore behave as ordinary at-issue content within the narrative scoreboard
rather than the actual scoreboard. We illustrate this for (29a) in (29b):
(29) a. Context: Venustiano is telling a true story to a researcher, César. He
introduces a character in the story, Don Miro, a one hundred year-old man
who is talking to his children, including Salvador. The story then continues
with his children responding and some further back and forth.
Ten=e’,
I=TOP
paal-e’ex,
child-B2PL
ten=e’
I=TOP
ma’
NEG
j-oken
PFV-enter
ti’
PREP
esclavitud=i’
slavery=NEG.CL
–ki
QUOT
‘ “I, children, I wasn’t a slave.” he said.’ Can Canul & Gutiérrez-Bravo
(2016: p. 136)
b.
v CActual c
DCv (say(m, p)) Table{v,c} DCc
CG{m,s} QUD{m,s} CPref{m,s}
m CNarrative s
DCm p Table{m,s} p DCs
CG{m,s} QUD{m,s} CPref{m,s}
where p is the proposition that Don Miro was not a slave
In terms of the illocutionary update associated with QUOT, then, we see that
effect on the actual conversational scoreboard is common to all sentence types: to
add the information regarding what the original speaker said to DCv.12 Different
sentence types give rise to different effects within the narrative scoreboard, of course,
but unlike with REP, these differences are not felt in the actual scoreboard. In terms
12 Even this we might reasonably consider to be more akin to Stalnaker’s goat than truly being part of
the conventionally encoded update. That is to say, the fact that the speaker demonstrated an utterance
within the narrative may often indicate the speaker’s belief that the individual did say this, but this
may not be part of their communicative intent per se.
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of at-issueness, we see that like REP, there is no proposal put on the Table in CActual
(or indeed on any Table) which includes information about the original speech event.
QUOT, then, serve two functions. First, they make explicit (often redundantly)
that the adjacent material is to be interpreted relative to an in-narrative scoreboard
rather than the actual one. Second, in so doing, they enough basic elements of
the conversational context within the narrative universe to help the audience figure
out where in the narrative universe they are located and who is talking to who
within that setting. While it’s unclear whether quotative elements in other languages
consistently show a similar restriction, we can note that the elements encoded by
the QUOT – speaker and addressee – are those which play privileged roles in the
scoreboard model, whereas other things common to ordinary verbal clauses such as
time, location, manner, etc. are not. The basic intuition is that dialogue in narrative –
whether fictional or real – involves displacing ourselves to some other point in time,
space, perspective, etc. Once at those alternative coordinates, agents in the narrative
can make moves like in any other conversation, moves which locally interact with
one another in normal ways (cf. Eckardt (2015) for a proposal for Free Indirect
Discourse in a broadly similar vein).
One question which arises at this point, then, is what the purpose of narratives
of this sort are if they do not serve to update the shared scoreboard elements of
the actual conversational scoreboard. One response could be to simply to relax the
normal assumption that enriching the CG (or CPref) is the purpose of conversation.
That is to say, we might consider narrative as representing a genre in which this goal
simply is not relevant. While this may well be true of some narratives, in other cases,
it would seem that simply abandoning this assumption is less plausible. Consider,
for instance the case of a politician on the campaign trail. Clearly, there is a very
salient actual issue the candidate aims to address: who is the best candidate to vote
for? And yet, the politician often will aim to settle this issue not by providing facts
about themself or their opponents, but rather by telling a narrative about the steel
mill worker or single mother they met out on the campaign trail. Such narratives do
not directly update the discourse scoreboard and yet, clearly this is often an effective
strategy of producing such a change despite this indirectness.
We assume therefore that updates to an in-narrative scoreboard may ultimately
impact the state of the actual conversation, but do so in a way that is far less direct.
Without a theory of narrative thought, we cannot say more than this, but hope that
it’s clear that we should not be troubled by the fact that narrative may fail to make
any at-issue contribution in some sense. What is notable, however, is that Mayan
quotatives present a rare case where the use of this narrative mode is conventionally
encoded by grammar.
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7 Conclusions
In this paper, I have investigated the behavior in discourse of Mayan quotatives,
focusing on Yucatec Maya ki(j) QUOT. While quotatives have often been regarded
as special kinds of reportative evidentials or verbs of saying, I have argued that
they show important differences (and similarities) with both of these elements,
summarized in (30):
(30) Properties of Quotatives, Reportatives, and Verbs of Saying:
REP SAY QUOT
Indirect speech use? Yes Yes No
Direct speech use? No Yes Yes
Original speech event not A-I Often conventional Pragmatic Conventional
Interaction with sentence type Variable, complex Narrow scope Wide scope
Details of original speech event Implicit Explicit Limited
In order to account for this set of properties, I have proposed a scoreboard
semantics for QUOT in which they demonstrate an ordinary update to an in-narrative
context, providing limited not-at-issue information about the original speech event.
Just as REP provide a distinct ‘mode’ of presenting indirect speech reports, Mayan
QUOT do the same for direct speech reports.
We close by returning to an outstanding puzzle noted in passing in §2. There
we saw that, despite the differences we have noted between QUOT and REP, the two
morphemes can and frequently do co-occur. When bin REP occurs inside of the
quoted material that ki(j) introduces, things are as expected and this merely quotes
an original speech event which happens to contain REP. However, when the reverse
situation obtains and REP occur outside of the quoted material, we unexpectedly
find a ‘reportative concord’ use which appears to have the same meaning as a
corresponding sentence without bin REP, (5). Beyond this, AnderBois (2019) shows
that examples which also contain SAY can behave similarly, as in (31).
(31) K-u
IPFV-A3
y-a’al-ik
EP-say-SS
bin=e’:
REP=TOP
ma’
NEG
táan
PROG
— ki
QUOT
bin
REP
‘he responded: no —he said.’ (Can Canul & Gutiérrez-Bravo 2016: 22)
We leave it to future work to analyze such cases, but note that various sorts of
similar such concord uses for REP appear to be cross-linguistically quite common, a
pattern that highlights the fact that despite the various differences between different
elements we have seen, REP, QUOT, and SAY nonetheless have a shared core that
goes above and beyond their propositional content.
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